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In November 1996, a hijacked Ethiopian Airlines jet crash landed in
Indian Ocean waters near the Comoro Islands. Among the casualties
were several American citizens.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, rogue states and interna-
tional terrorist groups commenced efforts, which continue today, to ac-
quire nuclear warheads and fissionable material from the successor na-
tions.
On April 19, 1995, the most destructive domestic terrorist attack in
American history was committed in Oklahoma City.
These and similar crimes plague the world in which we live. Efforts by
the United States government to prosecute international crime in U.S.
courts have inadvertently caused the erosion of the jurisdictional firewall
traditionally dividing domestic law enforcement agencies from the intelli-
gence community in the United States. Crimes abroad may violate
American law, and the investigation of domestic offenses may draw from
intelligence collected overseas. Both law enforcement and the intelli-
gence community may gather information about such crimes, and, as a
result, significant discovery issues may arise if the suspects are eventually
brought to trial.
I. COMMON TARGETS: THE GROWING CONVERGENCE OF SUBJECT
MATI'ER INTERESTS AMONG U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
For millennia, criminals have plotted in one country, committed
crimes in another, and fled to sanctuary in a third. For almost as long,
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and with varying degrees of success, nations have cooperated in finding
and apprehending those fugitives, and have extradited or rendered them
to justice. States also have reserved the right to apprehend and try of-
fenders against the law of nations, such as pirates and war criminals, re-
gardless of the locations of the crimes or the nationalities of the offend-
2ers.
But international crime now has gone wholesale. Asian triads engage
in unlawful commerce on a worldwide scale, as do South American nar-
cotics traffickers. Rogue states try to obtain nuclear expertise, biological
weapons, or chemical agents, and terrorist groups operate across hemi-
spheres.
These changes stem from a number of factors, including increased
capital mobility; the extraordinary sophistication of international terror-
ists and narcotraffickers; the continuing demand in the West for con-
trolled substances, and the economic advantages of their cultivation in
supplier nations; advances in the technology of counterfeiting and com-
munications; the collapse of the Soviet Union and the perceived avail-
ability of its nuclear materials and military hardware; the continuing hos-
tility between nations and peoples; and the simple greed of those
engaged in criminal enterprises. And, just as some criminal organizations
infiltrate national institutions and governments, others benefit from cal-
culated direction and support provided by rogue states.
In response, the United States has asserted criminal jurisdiction over
a wide range of actions that previously had been considered the respon-
sibility of the respective nations in whose territories the offenses oc-
curred. For example, Congress has asserted jurisdiction over narcotics
trafficking activities abroad, where the United States is the intended des-
.3tination; terrorist activities on foreign aircraft overseas, so long as even
1. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196 (1994) (providing statutory guidelines by which persons
both within and without the United States may be subject to extradition).
2 See, e.g., id § 1651 (providing that "[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of
piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United
States, shall be imprisoned for life").
3. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1994) (prohibiting the importation of controlled narcotics into
the United States); cf. 22 U.S.C. § 2291-4(a) (1994), which provides that:
it shall not be unlawful for authorized employees or agents of a foreign country... to
interdict or attempt to interdict an aircraft in that country's territory or airspace if-
(1) that aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug traffick-
ing; and
(2) the President of the United States, before interdiction occurs, has determined with
respect to that country that-
(A) interdiction is necessary because of the extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug
trafficking to the national security of that country; and
(B) the country has appropriate procedures in place to protect against the innocent




one American is on board;4 and the illicit transfer of fissionable materials
between two foreign nations."
Complementing these statutes is a broadened assertion of unilateral
U.S. authority to search suspects and their effects abroad, to arrest and
detain offenders outside the United States, and to apprehend suspects
from the territory of foreign countries without the host nation's consent,
even where extradition treaties or international law may suggest other-
wise.'
With proper preparation, therefore, the United States can apprehend
and prosecute transnational criminals. In recent years, for example, the
United States has asserted jurisdiction over, brought to this country, and
placed on trial several defendants whom it has arrested abroad on
7charges of international terrorism. When operating abroad, U.S. law en-
4. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339A (1994) (addressing the problem of terrorism and the
legal sanctions that attach to those who engage in terrorist activity); Act for the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (making it a crime to take a hos-
tage if either the hostage or the terrorist is an American citizen, or if the purpose of the hostage-
taking is to coerce the U.S. government); and the Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 31-32
(making it a crime to damage planes or injure passengers, regardless of where the act occurs).
5. See, e.g., id. § 175 (prohibiting the use, transfer, development, etc., of biological weap-
ons); id. § 831 (same for nuclear materials).
6. See, e.g., Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override Customary or
Other International Law in the Course of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities, 13 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 163 (1989), citing 28 U.S.C. § 533 and 18 U.S.C. § 3052 (concluding that the
FBI may investigate and arrest fugitives in a foreign state, even without the consent of the host
government); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 670 (1992) (holding that the
U.S.-Mexican extradition treaty does not provide an exclusive means by which the United
States may acquire custody of a suspect within Mexico in a case in which the respondent had
been apprehended in Mexico by persons acting on behalf of the United States without regard to
the treaty provisions); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of
property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country, at least where that non-
resident alien "has had no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States");
United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1092-93 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (observing that the defendant,
who was wanted in connection with a terrorist incident abroad, was lured into international wa-
ters, arrested, and transported to the United States); see also the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-293, § 814 (1996) (amending Title I of the National Secu-
rity Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. §§ 402-404h, to permit law enforcement agencies to ask the intelli-
gence community to collect "information outside the United States about individuals who are
not United States persons .... notwithstanding that the law enforcement agency intends to use
the information collected for purposes of a law enforcement investigation," id. § 403-5a). For
further discussion of the Intelligence Authorization Act, see infra text accompanying notes 149-
52.
7. Recent examples include the apprehensions of Ramzi Yousef, Omar Rezaq, and Mah-
moud Abouhalima on charges of international terrorism directed against American citizens.
Yousef had been indicted in connection with the February 26, 1993 bombing of the World
Trade Center, among other charges. On February 7,1995, he was arrested by Pakistani authori-
ties; turned over to the FBI, he was flown to the United States the next day. See David John-
ston, Fugitive in Trade Center Blast Is Caught and Returned to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1995, at
Al. Rezaq hijacked an Egyptian airplane to Malta on November 23, 1985, where he murdered
two of its passengers and attempted to kill three others. He was sentenced to 25 years in a Mal-
tese prison, but released in February 1993, at which time he boarded a plane to Sudan, routed
via Ghana, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. Upon his arrival in Nigeria he was met by Nigerian authori-
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forcement agencies normally-although not always-operate pursuant to
the laws of the host country, and may work closely with foreign govern-
ments to apprehend suspected offenders and secure their extradition or
rendition to the United States.8 They may share critical information with
the host nation's police and security services, and in exchange receive co-
operation in locating a fugitive or obtaining evidence to support a prose-
cution.
Accordingly, in order to enforce its criminal laws the United States
may need to collect evidence throughout the world, in a manner that en-
sures its admissibility in a U.S. courtroom. At the same time, the De-
partment of State may need to defend the American actions, U.S. diplo-
matic and commercial installations overseas may need to be secured, and
the nation may need to guard against potential retaliation both at home
and abroad. Finally, once the prosecution is underway, the Government
must ensure that there are no surprises, that the necessary evidence is
available, and that notwithstanding the transnational nature of the inves-
tigation, the strictures of United States v. Toscanino9 and Brady v. Mary-
land ° have been met.
But this expanded assertion of international criminal jurisdiction has
not occurred in a vacuum, as the United States also maintains an expan-
sive global network of intelligence collection activities. While the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) is perhaps the best-known component of that
apparatus, its espionage and covert action activities are complemented by
the signals intelligence operations of the National Security Agency
(NSA), the satellites orbited by the National Reconnaissance Office, the
ties, who turned him over to the FBI. See United States v. Rezaq, 908 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1995).
Abouhalima, another suspect in the World Trade Center bombing, was apprehended in Egypt
in March 1993. Some reports state that Egyptian authorities turned him over to U.S. authorities,
see, e.g., David Van Biema, So Glad to See You, TIME, Apr. 5, 1993, at 32, while others say that
he voluntarily turned himself over to the United States, see, e.g., Zina Hemady, Egypt: World
Trade Center Bombing Suspect Declares Innocence, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 25, 1993.
8. "Law enforcement agencies," for purposes of this Article, include the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and its constituent components, such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices; the De-
partment of the Treasury and its law enforcement arms, such as the Secret Service, Customs
Service, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; and other federal, state, and local
agencies with law enforcement authority.
The "intelligence community" comprises those agencies of the federal government with intelli-
gence collection responsibilities, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intel-
ligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), and the FBI (with respect to its coun-
terintelligence authorities), as well as those other agencies enumerated in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4) (1994).
9. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that courts may divest themselves of jurisdiction over
a defendant apprehended abroad and brought to the United States, where U.S. agents involved
have treated the defendant in a manner that shocks the conscience).
10. 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring production to the defendant of material exculpatory evi-
dence). Brady is discussed infira Parts II & III.
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human intelligence collected by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
and the operations of a dozen other U.S. intelligence organizations. Of
special note in this respect is the dual role played by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), which combines in one organization responsibility
to enforce U.S. law worldwide and to conduct counterintelligence activi-
ties both at home and, in some cases, overseas.
During most of the Cold War, the lines were clearly drawn between
the work of the intelligence community and the law enforcement com-
munity. U.S. law enforcement agencies, whether the FBI, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Customs Service, or the Depart-
ment of Justice concentrated primarily on crimes that had occurred and
could be investigated within U.S. territory.1' This domestic focus followed
naturally from the statutory responsibilities of the law enforcement agen-
cies and the structure of U.S. criminal law.
The intelligence agencies could not have been more different, in
terms of both geographical responsibility and subject matter. Unlike the
FBI, Department of Justice, and the other federal law enforcement agen-
cies, the CIA was expressly prohibited by the National Security Act from
exercising any "police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal
security functions" from the moment of its creation in 1947.12 The pri-
mary reasons for that "law enforcement" proviso were twofold. First, the
nation had recently witnessed in Hitler's Germany, and was continuing to
observe in Stalin's Soviet Union, the abuses that can arise from the com-
bination of intelligence collection activities and law enforcement author-
ity. And second, the FBI was jealous of its own prerogatives: Although
the Bureau did close its Latin American field offices in the late 1940s in
deference to the nascent CIA, the FBI was not prepared to accept any
challenge to its own core function of domestic law enforcement.
The strict delineation between intelligence and law enforcement was
facilitated by the fact that, simply stated, there was relatively little over-
lap between the two in 1947. Such overlap as there might be was ad-
dressed primarily by the FBI, which continued to exercise its counteres-
pionage functions within the United States as it had done during the
Second World War. Espionage within the United States and against the
United States clearly was a criminal offense and, therefore, a matter for
law enforcement, and so the Bureau (or, in appropriate instances, the
military) would continue to address it. Events abroad, however, were an-
11. To be sure, the FBI for decades has maintained Legal Attaches at selected U.S. diplo-
matic outposts, and in recent years the Drug Enforcement Administration has undertaken a
largely transnational role, in some ways foreshadowing the issues that now arise with greater
frequency.
12. Section 103(d)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 403-
3(d)(1) (1994).
Yale Law & Policy Review
other matter, for there the primary U.S. concern normally was not crime,
but Communism, against which American activities consisted primarily
of military and intelligence operations.
This paradigm served well, at least for the first three Cold War dec-
ades. The basic distinction remained between law enforcement and intel-
ligence activities, even as press revelations during the 1970s shed light
upon U.S. military, intelligence, and law enforcement abuses.13 But other
events were intruding that rendered the established separation less ten-
able. The 1960s already had witnessed the spread of international airline
terrorism, and although some claimed to see the Kremlin's hand behind
the gun, not all such acts could be traced to Soviet control. The use of
controlled substances in the West expanded, and foreign suppliers devel-
oped sophisticated production and distribution networks to meet the de-
mand. By the 1980s, the international proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction had joined international terrorism and narcotics trafficking as
issues of significant U.S. concern.
The United States met these challenges on the field of law enforce-
ment as well as that of intelligence. That two-track approach was rein-
forced by the twin collapses of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet
Union in 1991, which rattled the very foundations that had impelled the
creation of the postwar U.S. intelligence apparatus. Moreover, the rami-
fications of those collapses undermined one of the functional rationales
for maintaining the separation between intelligence and law enforce-
ment: nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons proliferation now com-
plement international terrorism and narcotics as areas of overlap be-
tween the law enforcement and intelligence communities, just as other
interests, such as tracking Russian missile stockpiles, or investigating do-
mestic bank robberies, still retain their primary identification with one or
the other arena.
Today, there is no clear primacy for either the law enforcement or in-
telligence communities in the realms of international terrorism, narcotics,
proliferation (as well as, in some cases, counterintelligence). 14 Still, the
13. During that time, the Executive Branch and Congress both mounted investigations, ex-
isting practices were terminated, legislation was enacted, new Executive Orders issued, and new
procedures implemented to regulate both intelligence and law enforcement activities.
14. See Stewart Baker, Panel Discusses Problems of Law Enforcement and Intelligence, 17
A.B.A. NAT'L SEcuRrry L. REP. 1, 1 (1995) (quoting former Director of Central Intelligence
R. James Woolsey, Baker observes that "[the new tension in relations between law enforce-
ment and intelligence stems in part from the fact that '[s]uch matters as terrorism, weapons pro-
liferation, narcotics and others have both foreign and domestic tails to them, so to speak."'); see
also REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON THE ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, PREPARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: AN APPRAISAL OF UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE, ch. 4 (Mar. 1, 1996) (referring to the new phenomenon giving rise to
this emerging relationship as "global crime").
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law enforcement and intelligence communities remain designed and op-
erated in fundamentally dissimilar manners, retaining differing legal
authorities, internal modes of organization, and governing paradigms.
Even with increasing numbers of joint successes, for those reasons
working together at times till can prove fitful.
This is because each set of organizations is created and operated with
certain clear responsibilities. Law enforcement agencies, for example,
must investigate crimes and collect evidence in accordance with precise
constitutional and statutory requirements. They organize their informa-
tion in a manner readily retrievable for purposes of litigation, master the
details of courtroom procedure and the criminal law, produce documents,
witnesses, and evidence for direct challenge by defense counsel, and
measure their success or failure in large part by the publicized rates of
conviction.
In contrast, intelligence agencies normally depend on sources that
cannot be revealed in court, and draw upon legal authorities separate
from those of law enforcement. Beyond its normal authorities to collect
intelligence abroad, the CIA, with specific presidential approval, also
may conduct covert actions abroad, such as working to prevent, deter, or
disrupt terrorist activities by means different from those of law enforce-
ment."5 The NSA, DIA, and NRO also collect intelligence abroad, oper-
ating within U.S. legal parameters separate from those of law enforce-
ment. The widespread use of intelligence information as evidence may
therefore jeopardize the specific legal authority of those intelligence
agencies to collect information abroad under standards that differ from
those of law enforcement, and also could raise a question of compliance
by the CIA with the law enforcement proviso of the National Security
Act. 6
Nor does the conduct of U.S. intelligence collection or covert action
operations lend itself well to the records requirements that are common
to law enforcement agencies. The documentary procedures of law en-
forcement agencies are highly specialized, directly designed to support
the investigation and prosecution of offenses; their formats and modes of
employment are not readily adaptable to intelligence agencies and their
operations. Rather, the intelligence agencies organize and maintain their
15. Covert action is defined as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to
influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of
the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." Section 503(e)
of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e). The statute requires ex-
plicit presidential approval in advance for the conduct of any covert action; provides that the
President shall ensure timely notification of the covert action to the intelligence committees of
the House and Senate; and states that no Presidential approval of covert action may authorize a
violation of the Constitution or any U.S. statute. See generally id. §§ 413, 413b, and 414.
16. See supra text accompanying note 12.
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records in a manner conducive to intelligence analysis and dissemination,
rather than for potential use as evidence. And, unlike prosecutors and
law enforcement agencies that can assess the results of their work by
means of public trials, intelligence agencies must work in secret with little
publicity about either their successes or their failures.
Nonetheless, both constitutional and statutory issues of discovery may
arise when intelligence activities produce information that may be rele-
vant either to the prosecution or the defense. 17 The failure to disclose in-
telligence information in specific cases may jeopardize the ability to
prosecute those cases and endanger the discovery rights of the respective
defendants. Intelligence sources or methods also may be placed at risk,
should they be disclosed in the course of criminal proceedings, s and the
very nature of intelligence work may render it difficult or impossible to
produce certain witnesses, such as foreign nationals who are clandes-
tinely assisting U.S. intelligence, for either the case-in-chief or production
to the defense.
This Article addresses those discovery rights and the commensurate
obligations that they place on prosecutors in cases that may involve intel-
ligence community information. In this respect, it should be observed
that the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA)19 does facilitate
the discovery and use of classified information during criminal proceed-
ings, thereby protecting defendants' rights while preserving the appropri-
ate degree of protection for classified information.20 But neither CIPA
17. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 14, at 4 (reporting former Deputy Attorney General Philip
Heymann's observation about the "difficulties for the intelligence agencies when they try to
comply with constitutional and statutory criminal discovery rules," Jim Woolsey's description
intelligence agencies as "'archivally challenged,"' partly for security reasons, and former Na-
tional Security Counsel Legal Advisor Paul Schott Stevens' comment that the Intelligence
Community is not simply an asset of the prosecution).
18. See Section 103(c)(6) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, 50 U.S.C. §403-
3(c)(6), explicitly requires the Director of Central Intelligence to "protect intelligence sources
and methods from unauthorized disclosure." The statute, of course, is to be applied in a manner
consistent with the Constitution and its trial guarantees, as well as with relevant statutory law
such as the Classified Information Procedures Act, discussed infra notes 19-20 and accompany-
ing text.
19. See 18 U.S.C. App. 3 (1980).
20. The CIPA was enacted in order to protect the secrecy of classified information during
the course of criminal proceedings, while preserving the defendant's constitutional and statutory
rights. The CIPA sets forth procedures whereby specific classified information may be reviewed
by the court for possible disclosure to the defendant and use at trial. In particular:
The court, upon a sufficient showing, may authorize the United States to delete specified items
of classified information from documents to be made available to the defendant[,] ... to substi-
tute a summary of the information for such classified documents, or to substitute a statement
admitting relevant facts that the classified information would tend to prove. Id. § 4. If, however,
the court finds that disclosure of the classified information must be made in order to satisfy the
defendant's rights, the Attorney General may determine that the information nonetheless may
not be released, at which point the court may take appropriate action, up to and including dis-
missal of the indictment. See id. § 6.
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nor any other statute specifically addresses the extent to which informa-
tion in the possession of the intelligence community may be subject in the
first place to the defendant's fights of discovery or the prosecution's obli-
gation to search.
Rather, the normal federal discovery requirements delineate those
boundaries.2' Unfortunately, in some situations the mere invocation of
the terms "CIA" or "intelligence" may raise unusual concerns: for exam-
ple, defendants may claim they have been the victims of secret govern-
ment conspiracies, prosecutors may be concerned that their cases will be-
come complicated by the law of espionage and classified information; and
judges may find themselves faced with discovery challenges that pose the
prospect of lengthy digressions into the world of clandestine information.
Certain defendants may seek discovery from a broad range of intelli-
gence agencies, even in the absence of any showing that those agencies
contributed to the criminal investigation; prosecutors and judges may
conclude that intelligence agencies are somehow different and that the
normal boundaries of discovery should be expanded.
But even where a prosecution may involve intelligence agency infor-
mation, those normal boundaries can and should be respected. Part II
presents a general overview of the federal discovery obligations, as de-
veloped outside the specific context of intelligence records, and Part III
describes the means by which those rules are applied beyond the relevant
prosecutor's office itself, including a review of one recent case in which
the obligations of search and discovery were extended to a number of in-
telligence agencies. Drawing from those basic foundations, Part IV con-
cludes that the search and discovery requirements applicable to intelli-
gence agency records generally should be similar to those which apply to
non-intelligence agencies, thereby reflecting both the case law and prag-
matic considerations of resources and efficiency.
II. The Central Discovery Requirements in Federal Criminal Prosecutions
The federal discovery rules generally include the constitutionally
compelled Brady obligation to produce material evidence relating to guilt
or punishment, the statutory duty under the Jencks Act to produce wit-
It must be emphasized that CIPA is only a procedural statute. As the court observed in United
States v. McVeigh, 923 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1996):
CIPA does not enlarge the scope of discovery or of Brady. [Rather, if] in complying
with the duty under Rule 16 or Brady, government counsel must provide copies or
permit inspection of documents that are now classified, they have the choice of declas-
sifying, redacting, or seeking protective orders restricting access and use of the sensi-
tive information under CIPA.
Id. at 1314 (citations omitted).
21. See infra Part Il.
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ness statements, and the rights provided by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. A brief review of those rules is appropriate, to lay
the foundation for their application to the intersection between law en-
forcement and intelligence.22
Although their specific terms vary, the overall goals of the various
discovery rules are similar: to ensure a fair and balanced trial for every
federal criminal defendant.23 Although each plainly imposes a duty upon
the government to produce certain information to the defendant, the ex-
tent to which the prosecution must search other governmental sources
for such information has required extensive judicial clarification.
A. Brady v. Maryland
In 1963, the Supreme Court examined in Brady v. Maryland,24
whether withholding from a criminal defendant the confession of an ac-
complice violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Court concluded that "the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespec-
tive of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. ' 'z Without such dis-
closure, the Court reasoned, defendants would be deprived of their Four-
teenth Amendment rights.26
Accordingly, Brady generally requires the prosecution to provide the
defendant with evidence material to the guilt or punishment of the ac-
cused. The failure to produce such evidence may constitute reversible er-
ror where the defendant is convicted. For example, such error has been
found where the prosecution failed to disclose that evidence contained
perjured testimony, did not abide by a pretrial request for specific evi-
22. A detailed description of those criminal discovery rules is beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle. For more comprehensive discussions, see generally, Steven Washawsky & Gregory D. Bas-
suk, Discovery, 84 GEO. L.J. 992 (1996) (providing a general discussion of Brady, the Jencks
Act, and Rule 16); Colleen A. O'Leary et al., Discovery: Eighth Survey of White Collar Crime
Procedural Issues, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1049 (1993) (providing insight into the scope of dis-
covery in criminal proceedings); and Hon. H. Lee Sarokin & William E. Zuckermann, Pre-
sumed Innocent? Restrictions on Criminal Discovery in Federal Court Belie this Presumption, 43
RUTGERS L. REV. 1089 (1991) (addressing discovery in criminal matters).
23. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments grant individuals the right to due process and the
right to a fair trial, respectively. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law .... ); id. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence").
24. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).




dence, or failed to respond to a generalized request for Brady informa-
tion?
Materiality will not be found for purposes of Brady, however, if there
is only a "mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might
have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the
trial...."2 Rather, in order to constitute a Brady violation, the undis-
closed information must create "a reasonable doubt that did not other-
wise exist." 29 A "constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be
reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."30 Moreover, although
the rule is constitutionally-mandated, Brady rights are not boundless.
Brady did establish one additional avenue by which to ensure due proc-
ess, but even so "[t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in
a criminal case, and Brady did not create one."31
B. The Jencks Act
Even before its Brady decision, the Supreme Court had addressed the
due process implications of the government's failure to disclose witness
statements. In Jencks v. United States,2 the Justices examined whether
the prosecution should have produced copies of FBI reports made by two
government witnesses, members of the Communist Party whom the Bu-
reau had paid to report on the defendant's affiliation and participation in
Party events, after those informants had testified at trial about those re-
ports. The Jencks Court found that the defendant indeed had been
"entitled to an order directing the Government to produce for inspection
all reports of [the two witnesses] in its possession, written and, when
orally made, as recorded by the FBI, touching the events and activities as
to which they testified at trial."33
Concerned with the broad scope of the Court's decision, Justice Clark
27. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,103-07 (1976).
28. Id. at 109-10; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (asserting that
the purpose of the Brady rule is "not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by
which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not occur"); United
States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (stating that "the purpose of the duty is not
simply to correct an imbalance of advantage," but also "to make of the trial a search for truth
informed by all relevant material").
29. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112; see also id at 110 ("[T]here are situations in which evidence is
obviously of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be dis-
closed even without a specific request.").
30. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678. The Bagley Court further stated that "[t]he evidence is material
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 682.
31. Weatherford v. Bursey 429 U.S. 545,559 (1977).
32. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
33. Id. at 668.
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asserted in dissent that:
[u]nless Congress changes the rule announced by the Court today, those in-
telligence agencies of our Government engaged in law enforcement may as
well close up shop, for the Court has opened their files to the criminal and
thus afforded him a Roman holiday for rummaging through confidential in-
formation as well as vital national secrets.34
Reflecting that concern, Congress promptly enacted a new statutory
provision, commonly known as the Jencks Act, to regulate the produc-
tion of witness statements at trial. In pertinent part, the Act provides
that:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Govern-
ment witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant)
shall be the subject of subpoena, discovery, or inspection until said witness
has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on direct exami-
nation, the court shall, on motion of the defendant, order the United States
to produce any statement (as hereinafter defined) of the witness in the pos-
session of the United States which relates to the subject matter as to which
the witness has testified....
(e) The term "statement", as used in subsection (b), (c), and (d) of this sec-
tion in relation to any witness called by the United States, means-
(1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise
adopted or approved by him;
(2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcrip-
tion thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement
made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of
such oral statement; or
(3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any,
made by said witness to a grand jury.
35
The Jencks Act sets forth three criteria: the requested material must
be a "statement," as defined in subsection (e); the statement must be "in
the possession of the United States"; and it must correspond with the tes-
timony of the witness. 36 Subsection (e)'s definition of "statement" is not
to be read narrowly, however," and the trial court has wide discretion to
34. Id. at 681-82 (Clark, J., dissenting).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1994).
36. Interpreting the breadth of the fledgling Jencks Act for the first time, the Supreme
Court observed that the Act "narrowed the scope for needful judicial interpretation to an un-
usual degree[, for it] clearly defines procedures and plainly indicates the circumstances for their
applications." Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 (1959).
37. The Palermo Court noted that:
[t]he suggestion that the detailed statutory procedures restrict only the production of
the type of statement described in subsection (e), leaving all other statements, e.g.,
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interpret the Jencks Act in the specific circumstances." In practice, the
courts have interpreted "statement" rather generously, so that a
"statement" need not be a verbatim transcription of the witness's impres-
sions, as long as the document asserted to be a statement has been ap-
proved or adopted39 in a recognizable manner by the witness.4
One court has held, for example, that the term comprehends "written
statements of the witness and contemporaneous recordings or transcripts,
including stenographic notes of testimony or statements.",4' Another has
held that the term means "a statement of a witness whose direct testi-
mony is presented in a criminal trial, which statement had been previ-
ously recorded and approved or adopted by the witness., 42 Accordingly,
for purposes of the Jencks Act, a "statement" may be either a recording
or verbatim transcript of the witness's own words, or a document that
purports to comprise the witness's impressions that is actually endorsed• 41
in some manner by the witness.
non-verbatim, non-contemporaneous records of oral statements, to be produced under
pre-existing rules of procedure as if the statute had not been passed at all, flouts the
whole history and purpose of the enactment. It would mock Congress to attribute to it
an intention to surround the production of the carefully restricted and most trustwor-
thy class of statements with detailed procedural safeguards, while allowing more dubi-
ous and less reliable documents a more favored legal status, free from safeguards in
the tournament of trials. Il at 349-50.
38. See id at 353 ("Final decision as to production must rest ... within the good sense and
experience of the district judge guided by the standards we have outlined, and subject to the
appropriately limited review of appellate courts.") (footnotes omitted).
39. See United States v. Gonzales, 90 F.3d 1363, 1369 (8th Cir. 1996) (observing that "oral,
untranscribed, nonadopted assertions are not 'statements' within the meaning of the Jencks
Act") (emphasis added).
40. In Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94 (1976), the Court held that
a writing prepared by a Government lawyer relating to the subject matter of the testi-
mony of a Government witness that has been 'signed or otherwise adopted or ap-
proved' by the Government witness is producible under the Jencks Act, and is not
rendered unproducible because a Government lawyer interviews the witness and
writes the 'statement.'
lId at 98. The Goldberg Court rejected the argument that a statement given to the government's
attorney, that was signed and adopted by the witness, is protected as work-product, and is,
therefore, not producible as Jencks Act material. Id. at 105 (asserting that "[t]he objective of
preventing 'rummaging' plainly adds no support to the argument that Congress meant that dis-
tinctions should be made based upon the occupation of the Government official to whom the
witness gave the statement").
41. United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453,463 (8th Cir. 1985).
42. United States v. Nickell, 552 F.2d 684,687 (6th Cir. 1977).
43. In Nickell, an FBI agent's record of a witness statement had been produced to the de-
fendant. On appeal, the defendant argued that because the agent himself had interviewed the
witness, that agent had become a "witness" himself. Hence, the defendant argued that the
Jencks Act had required the government to provide him with everything in its files written by
that FBI agent.
Rejecting that argument, the court stated that the
endorsement of this broad right would require either a wholesale turnover of FBI files
to any defendant on demand or, at a minimum, that the trial judge examine for rele-
vance and materiality all of the reports filed by any government agent who took the
witness stand. The first of these alternatives would have the potentiality for placing in
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Failure to comply with the Jencks Act will result in striking the testi-
mony of the government witness.4 At times, this may prove fatal to the
prosecution. But the denial of Jencks Act material does not automatically
constitute reversible error, especially where the appellate court finds it
unlikely that the omission was made in bad faith or had a material effect
upon the verdict.5
C. Rule 16
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide a third route of dis-
covery, allowing defendant to obtain his own statements and other items
material to the defense. Rule 16(a)(1) provides, in relevant part:
(A) Statement of Defendant. Upon request of a defendant the government
must disclose to the defendant and make available for inspection, copying, or
photographing: any relevant written or recorded statements made by the de-
fendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody, or control of the
government, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due dili-
gence may become known, to the attorney for the government ....
(C) Documents and Tangible Objects. Upon request of the defendant the
government shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph
books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places,
the hands of a person (or persons) charged with crime much confidential government
information which had no bearing at all upon the issue of guilt or innocence at the trial
involved .... In the face of clear Congressional opposition to such 'rummaging' of the
FBI files as was expressed in the Jencks Act, and in the absence of any clear affirma-
tive mandate from the Supreme Court we decline the invitation to adopt such a broad
(and necessarily unilateral) discovery rule.
Id at 689.
For an early interpretation of the Jencks Act that comports with the Nickell court's reasoning,
see Palermo 360 U.S. at 350. In Palermo, the Court stated:
One of the most important motive forces behind the enactment of this legislation was
the fear that an expansive reading of Jencks would compel the undiscriminating pro-
duction of agents' summaries of interviews regardless of their character or complete-
ness. Not only was it strongly feared that disclosure of memoranda containing the in-
vestigative agent's interpretations and impressions might reveal the inner workings of
the investigative process and thereby injure the national interest, but it was felt to be
grossly unfair to allow the defense to use statements to impeach a witness which could
not fairly be said to be the witness's own rather than the product of the investigator's
selections, interpretations and interpolations.
Id at 350.
44. The Jencks Act provides that
[i]f the United States elects not to comply with an order of the court... to deliver to the defen-
dant any such statement, or such portion thereof as the court may direct, the court shall strike
from the record the testimony of the witness, and the trial shall proceed unless the court in its
discretion shall determine that the interests of justice require that a mistrial be declared.
18 U.S.C. § 3500(d) (1994).
45. See Moeckly, 769 F.2d at 464 (stating that where there is "no indication of bad faith on
the part of the Government, and no indication of prejudice to the defendant," admission of the
testimony of a minor witness was not reversible error).
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or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody or
control of the government, and which are material to the preparation of the
defendant's defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in
chief at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant. 4
In short, Rule 16(a)(1)(A) provides that the government must honor
defendants' discovery requests for their own "relevant" statements.
Similarly, Rule 16(a)(1)(C) provides for discovery of those documents
and other items that are "material to the preparation of the defendant's
defense," as well as those that are "intended for use by the government
as evidence in chief" or which "were obtained from or belong to the de-
fendant." 47 Whether a statement or other item is "relevant" or "material"
is a question for the court;4 moreover, "statements" discoverable under
Rule 16(a)(1)(A) are not limited to those made to the government.
Rather, the term includes defendant statements given to third parties, so, • 49
long as they indeed are relevant and in the government's possession.
Just as the government's failure to satisfy the requirements of Brady
and the Jencks Act may result in reversible error, so may the failure to
produce Rule 16 material.-5 Even so, the Rule 16 requirements differ in
several ways from those of Brady and the Jencks Act. Brady, for exam-
46. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A), (C). In 1974, the advisory committee reported that
the amendment making disclosure mandatory under the circumstances prescribed ....
[comports with] the view that broad discovery contributes to the fair and efficient administra-
tion of criminal justice by providing the defendant with enough information to make an in-
formed decision as to plea; by minimizing the undesirable effect of surprise at the trial; and by
otherwise contributing to an accurate determination of the issue of guilt or innocence.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note (1974).
47. The Supreme Court has recently clarified the scope of Rule 16(a)(1)(C). See United
States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1485 (1996) ("[W]e conclude that in the context of Rule 16
'the defendant's defense' means the defendant's response to the Government's case-in-chief....
We hold that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) authorizes defendants to examine Government documents ma-
terial to the preparation of their defense against the Government's case-in-chief, but not to the
preparation of selective-prosecution claims.").
48. See, e.g., United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon,
J., dissenting) ("The word 'relevant' in the Rule is not an idle word. It means something. Rele-
vant to what? The obvious intent is to refer to statements that were 'relevant' to the offenses
charged."); see also United States v. Graham, 83 F.3d 1466, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Under Rule
16, evidence is material if there is a strong indication that it will play an important role in un-
covering admissible evidence, aiding witness preparation.... or assisting impeachment or re-
buttal.") (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory commit-
tee's note (1974) ("Although the Advisory Committee decided not to codify the Brady Rule,
the requirement that the government disclose documents and tangible objects 'material to the
preparation of his defense' underscores the importance of disclosure of evidence favorable to
the defendant.").
49. See Caldwell, 543 F.2d at 1352-53 (rejecting "arguments that 'statements' discoverable
under Rule 16(a) are only those made to governmental agents," and noting "the fundamental
fairness of granting the accused equal access to his own words, no matter how the Government
came by them") (footnotes omitted).
50. It should be noted, however, that "cases consistently have required a showing of preju-
dice to the substantial rights of the defendant before reversing because of an error in adminis-
tering the discovery rules." United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1978).
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ple, requires the production of exculpatory or mitigating materials, while
the Jencks Act relates solely to witness statements. In contrast, Rule
16(a)(1)(A) and (C) apply to a broader range of items.
Moreover, the Rule 16 obligations arise at the pre-trial stage, and im-
pose a continuing responsibility upon the Government to produce re-
sponsive material. In contrast, the Brady rule and the Jencks Act can be
satisfied at various stages in the litigation process.51 Brady, for example,
"is fulfilled when a disclosure of exculpatory material is made at a time
such that it allows the defense to make effective use of the material at
trial [although] 'disclosure to be effective must be made at a time when
the disclosure would be of value to the accused.' ' ', 2 The Jencks Act is in-
voked at trial, and is satisfied so long as the defendant is afforded a
"reasonable opportunity to examine [the witness statement] and prepare
for its use in the trial." 53
The three discovery avenues provided by Brady, the Jencks Act, and
Rule 16 generally complement one other. Prosecutors and defense coun-
sel regularly invoke the rules and, in the usual course of events, the scope
of their respective duties is relatively clear. Relevant police and prosecu-
tion files are searched, the responsive documents are produced, and any
controversies that may arise are resolved within limited boundaries.
But where requests are made for materials in the possession of other
government entities, the boundaries of discovery may not be so clear.
And those boundaries may appear even less distinct where a criminal
proceeding concerns international terrorism, narcotics trafficking from
abroad into the United States, or the global proliferation of chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons. But even in such cases, the standard prac-
tices followed in more traditional domestic prosecutions may be applied
as well.
51. In United States v. Deerfield Specialty Papers, Inc. 501 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
(mem.), the court noted that
the importance of making a clarification between the roles afforded by F.R.Crim.P.
16(a)(1) and the Brady rule.... This distinction is necessary because case law has con-
sistently held that Brady did not create a discovery device as was intended with the
promulgation of F.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1). Fishing expeditions into the government's files
and records are not cognizable under Brady and its progeny, especially at the pretrial
stage.... 'Where documentary evidence is exculpatory, it may be within both Brady
and Rule 16, but nonexculpatory records are obtainable in advance of trial only by vir-
tue of Rule 16. It is conceivable that some documents which are not covered by Rule
16.... may be Brady material because of their content.'... The Court will not confuse
the two (2) [sic] rules by applying the time-of-disclosure element of F.R.Crim.P.
16(a)(1) to the nature-of-information-to-be-disclosed as dictated in Brady.
Id. at 818-19 (quoting United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1977) (citations
omitted)).
52. United States v. Shifflett, 798 F. Supp. 354, 355 (W.D. Va. 1992) (quoting United States
v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775, 779 (4th Cir. 1970) (citation omitted)).
53. United States v. Holmes, 722 F.2d 37,40 (4th Cir. 1983).
Vol. 16:331, 1998
Intelligence Agencies
III. ALIGNMENT, OR THE PROSECUTION TEAM
In general, the courts have held that federal discovery obligations ex-
tend to those government agencies that are so closely "aligned" with the
prosecution of a specific matter that justice requires their records be
subject to the respective discovery obligations!" The issue also has been
cast in terms of the "prosecution team," consisting of those agencies
whose activities so closely support a specific prosecution that justice re-
quires them to be subject to the discovery obligations." Described in ei-
ther manner, the inquiry is critically important both when formulating re-
sponses to discovery requests and when federal prosecutors seek to
search files in advance of such requests. 6
These issues arise because none of the discovery rules explicitly de-
fine the intra-governmental limits of their obligations. For example, it is
not clear from the text of Brady itself exactly whose records the prosecu-
tion must search. Similarly, while the Jencks Act applies to items "in the
possession of the United States,"' the statute does not confirm whether
the obligation is limited to statements that are in the prosecution's actual
possession, extends to documents constructively in the prosecution's pos-
session, or, following the literal language of the statute, extends all the
way to statements in the possession of any U.S. Government entity.
Completing the trilogy, Rule 16(a)(1)(A) and (C) provide that the duty
extends to statements in the "possession, custody or control" of the
"government" that the prosecutor would be able to locate by the
"exercise of due diligence."58
Drawing from the case law to provide general guidance in this area,
the United States Attorneys' Manual observes that
an investigative or prosecutive agency becomes aligned with the government
prosecutor when it becomes actively involved in the investigation or the
54. For examples of cases relying on "alignment" analysis, see United States ex reL Smith v.
Fairman, 769 F.2d 386, 391 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1272 (5th
Cir. 1977); and United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500,1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
55. For examples of cases using the term "prosecution team," see United States v. Morris,
80 F.3d 1151, 1170 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569 (5th Cir. 1979);
and United States v. Mannarino, 850 F. Supp. 57, 64-65 (D. Mass. 1994).
56. The report of the Joint Task Force on Intelligence and Law Enforcement recognized
the growing problems posed by the overlapping interests of the intelligence and the law en-
forcement communities. See JOINT TASK FORCE ON INTELLIGENCE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT TO THE AT'Y GEN. AND DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, at 7-8 (May 1995).
The Task Force noted "the lack of consistent policies and procedures" in this area as an obsta-
cle that needs to be overcome by "coherently defin[ing] and regulariz[ing]" the "policies that
trigger Intelligence Community participation in criminal litigation." Id. at 7. The Task Force
concluded that "[i]n particular, the issue of what constitutes 'alignment' of an Executive Branch
agency with the prosecution so as to require searches of that agency's files for purposes defined
in law (for example, Brady and the Jencks Act) needs to be clarified." Id.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1994).
58. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A), (C).
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prosecution of a particular case. When that occurs, the agency's files are
subject to the same requirement of search and disclosure as the files of the
prosecuting attorney or lead agency.
The Manual cautions, however, that "the mere fact that an agency has
been solicited to produce documents generated independently of the
criminal case does not necessarily result in the alignment of that agency
with the prosecutor." 6
Where law enforcement and intelligence overlap, as in matters of in-
ternational terrorism, transnational crime, and weapons proliferation, the
alignment issues can be significant. The challenge lies in distinguishing
cases in which an intelligence agency has participated actively in the in-
vestigation of a matter, notwithstanding its own lack of law enforcement
authority, from those in which it simply has provided the prosecution
with information it collected for other purposes, or where it has engaged
in other activities separate from the criminal investigation. Even in the
latter cases, however, courts at times may conclude that discovery is ap-
propriate.
These types of issues arose, for example, during discovery proceed-
ings in the prosecution of Timothy McVeigh for the April 19, 1995,
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The defense
made numerous requests for the production of documents and informa-
tion, the fulfillment of which would necessitate comprehensive searches
not only of prosecution files, but of those maintained by the CIA, NSA,
and DIA as well.6" In a domestic prosecution with no apparent relation to
international terrorism, must the government satisfy such demands and,
if so, how wide is its duty to search? An overly constrained response
might deprive a defendant of his or her due process rights, while too
broad an interpretation of the discovery obligations could encourage un-
founded requests, promote inefficiency, and jeopardize intelligence
sources and methods.
Clearly, the government must satisfy the requirements of Brady, the
Jencks Act, and Rule 16. Neither the courts nor Congress, however, have
yet defined the precise boundaries of those obligations insofar as they
may require a prosecutor to produce information that is in the custody of
federal intelligence agencies, especially absent any showing that those
agencies have contributed to the specific law enforcement effort or hold
materials of the nature described in those criminal discovery rules. Even
so, the normal discovery procedures developed in non-intelligence con-
59. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, voL.9A
CRIMINAL DIV., pt.3A, ch. 90.210(D)(1) (1997).
60. Id. (citing United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543,1553 (9th Cir. 1986)).
61. For further discussion of the McVeigh prosecution, see infra Section III.D.
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texts may be applied here as well.
A. Brady
General guidelines for Brady purposes may be gleaned from the re-
ported cases, although "[a]s has proved true of the other aspects of Brady
jurisprudence, no formula defining the scope of the duty to search can be
expected to yield easily predicted results."62 To some extent, the govern-
ment's duty to search for potential Brady material held by a specific
agency may be broader where the prosecution and the agency in question
are under the same sovereign, federal or state, and certainly will exist
where the law enforcement investigation has been conducted jointly with
that second agency.
At the outset, it should be observed that all information within a par-
ticular prosecutor's office falls within the ambit of Brady. In Giglio v.
United States3 one prosecutor had promised a key witness that he would
not be prosecuted if he cooperated with the government. 4 A subsequent
prosecutor, however, was unaware of that promise and did not disclose it
to the defense.65 This omission violated Brady, for "[t]he prosecutor's of-
fice is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government....
A promise made by one attorney must be attributed, for these purposes,
to the Government." 66 Giglio adds that documentary evidence within the
same prosecutor's office, even concerning an unrelated case, is subject to
Brady obligations.67 Intelligence information, therefore, that has been
provided to a U.S. Attorney's Office for use in one case may well be
subject to discovery in another criminal proceeding handled by that Of-
fice.
But beyond information already in its possession, the prosecution
may need to search for material in the hands of some other agency. Inde-
pendent government entities may conduct separate investigations of a
matter, however, and the alignment doctrine does not make it incumbent
upon the prosecution to seek out documents in every conceivable agency.
Rather, the inquiry under Brady is whether those agencies are closely
aligned on the facts"--whether, for example, they cooperated on an es-
62. United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
63. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
64. See id. at 153.
65. See id. at 152.
66. Id. at 154; see also Carey v. Duckworth, 738 F.2d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that
"a prosecutor's office cannot get around Brady by keeping itself in ignorance, or [by] compart-
mentalizing information about different aspects of a case").
67. See 405 U.S. at 154.
68. See United States ex rel. Smith v. Fairman, 769 F.2d 386,391 (7th Cir. 1985). In Fairman
the court stated,
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sentially joint investigation or simply pursued separate interests in the
same topic. In this respect, in considering the use of perjured testimony,
the Fifth Circuit has "declined to draw a distinction between different
agencies under the same government, focusing instead upon the
'prosecution team' that includes both investigative and prosecutorial per-
sonnel."6 9
In United States v. Brooks' the D.C. Circuit found a Brady violation 71
where the'prosecution had failed to check the personnel file of a police
officer, the government's key witness in a drug case, who had been shot
with her own service revolver in a colleague's apartment.7 2 The court
stated that "[in some cases, the duty to search flows straight from the na-
ture of the files.... Where[, however,] the file's link to the case is less
clear, the court must also consider whether there was enough of a pros-
pect of exculpatory materials to warrant a search." 73 The Brooks court
observed that "[t]he cases finding a duty to search have involved files
maintained by branches of government 'closely aligned with the prosecu-
tion,' and in each case the court has found the bureaucratic boundary too
weak to limit the duty." 74 Applying these principles to the specific, the
court found a duty to obtain the witness's personnel file "given the close
working relationship between the.., police and the U.S. Attorney."75
Similarly, in United States v. Deutsch,76 the Fifth Circuit addressed the
implications of Brady where a postal employee, who allegedly had ac-
cepted payment from the defendant in exchange for credit cards stolen
from the mail,77 had become the key government witness. 7 When the de-
fendant moved to obtain that employee's personnel file, the prosecution
responded that it did not possess it.79 Although discounting the position
"that the government was obliged to obtain evidence from third parties,"
the Deutsch court held nonetheless that "there is no suggestion in Brady
[t]he prosecutor's ignorance of the existence of [the police officer's] worksheet does
not justify the State's failure to produce it, since Brady provides that the good faith or
bad faith of the prosecution is irrelevant to the due process inquiry.... This may be
especially true when the withheld evidence is under the control of a state instrumen-
tality closely aligned with the prosecution, such as the police.
Id. (citations omitted).
69. United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566,569 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted).
70. 966 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
71. See id. at 1503.
72. See id at 1501.
73. Id. at 1503.
74. Id. (citation omitted).
75. Id.
76. 475 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1973).
77. See id. at 56.




that different 'arms' of the government, particularly when so closely con-
nected as this one for the purpose of the case, are severable entities. '
The Seventh Circuit has adopted a similar approach, observing that
as a general rule, the government's obligation to disclose exculpatory or im-
peaching information under Brady is limited to that information which is
then known to the government. Although we have not interpreted Brady as
requiring prosecutors to affirmatively seek out information not presently in
their possession, we have found it improper for a prosecutor's office to re-
main ignorant about certain aspects of a case or to compartmentalize infor-
mation so that only investwating officers, and not the prosecutors them-
selves, would be aware of it.
That the legal separation between federal agencies is not dispositive is
reflected by those cases that have found Brady alignment even across
federal-state jurisdictional boundaries. Applying Giglio v. United States,
the Fifth Circuit has found that where "two governments, state and fed-
eral, pooled their investigative energies to a considerable extent," and
where "[t]he entire effort was marked by this spirit of cooperation and
state officers were important witnesses in the federal prosecution," all of
the agencies involved were part of the prosecution team for Brady pur-
poses.83 But a state prosecution that has received no assistance from fed-
eral authorities, or vice-versa, ordinarily will not be obliged to search for
or produce Brady material in the possession of those other authorities, at
least where the first set of prosecutors has no contemporaneous knowl-
edge of the contents of the other agency's files. Indeed, this holds true
even where subsequent events demonstrate that those files did in fact
contain exculpatory material.8
80. AL The court reasoned that
[t]he government cannot compartmentalize the Department of Justice and permit it to
bring a charge affecting a government employee in the Post Office and use him as its
principal witness, but deny having access to the Post Office files. In fact it did not even
deny access, but only present possession without even an attempt to remedy the defi-
ciency.
Id.
81. United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169 (7th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
82. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
83. United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 569-70 (5th Cir. 1979). In Antone, the Fifth Cir-
cuit added that:
federal and state sovereignty overlap in many respects. Imposing a rigid distinction be-
tween federal and state agencies which have cooperated intimately from the outset of
an investigation would artificially contort the determination of what is mandated by
due process. Rather than endorse a per se rule, we prefer a case-by-case analysis of the
extent of interaction and cooperation between the two governments.
Id. at 570.
84. Even as to evidence within the same government there are limits to what a prosecutor
must furnish under the Brady rules. A state prosecutor who does not have knowledge or posses-
sion of exculpatory material is not obliged by the Brady decision to find out if the F.B.I. has
such material, particularly where the defendant has knowledge that the F.B.I. investigated the
case. See United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500,1503 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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In United States v. Osorio,85 the First Circuit concluded that "'[t]he
government' is not a congery of independent hermetically sealed com-
partments; and the prosecutor in the courtroom, the United States At-
torney's Office in which he works, and the FBI are not separate sover-
eignties. The prosecution of criminal activity is a joint enterprise among
all these aspects of 'the government. ' Moreover, Osorio imposed a
duty of reasonable inquiry on the prosecution, stating that
The prosecutor charged with discovery obligations cannot avoid finding out
what 'the government' knows, simply by declining to make reasonable in-
quiry of those in a position to have relevant knowledge. The criminal respon-
sibility of a corporation can be founded on the collective knowledge of its in-
dividual employees and agents. There is no reason why similar principles of
institutional responsibility should not be used to analyze the actions of indi-
vidual government attorneys called upon to represent the government as an
institution in matters of court-ordered disclosure obligations.8
7
For purposes of Brady, therefore, the prosecution must determine
which other agencies are "in a position to have relevant knowledge."
Even so, in United States v. Morris the Seventh Circuit declined to hold
that Brady "impos[es] a duty on the prosecutor's office to learn of infor-
mation possessed by other government agencies that have no involve-
ment in the investigation or prosecution at issue," 9 and thus rejected de-
fense arguments that the prosecutors must seek out "information in the
hands of other government agencies that at various times conducted in-
dependent investigations of [defendants' corporation's] affairs."' The
court concluded that "the prosecution team, which included investigating
officers and agents, had no knowledge of the specific documents identi-
fied by defendants. The prosecutors therefore had no affirmative duty to
discover those documents and to disclose them to defendants."91
The specificity and breadth of any defense request for another
agency's files also come into play. Where the defense can produce spe-
cific reasons to believe that files may contain Brady material, the courts
more readily may find a duty to search. In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,92 the
Court considered Brady in the context of a child abuse case, in which the
state had failed to produce records of the Commonwealth's Children and
85. 929 F.2d 753,758 (1st Cir. 1991).
86. Id at 760.
87. Id. at 761 (citation omitted); see also id. at 762 (stating that trial counsel for the gov-
ernment has the duty to inquire "among all those in the government in a position to know" of
relevant information and to demand "compliance with disclosure responsibilities by all relevant
dimensions of the government.").
88. 80 F.3d 1151 (7th Cir. 1996).
89. Id at 1169.
90. Id. at 1169-70.
91. Id. at 1170.
92. 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
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Youth Services. Although that agency's records generally were privileged
under state law, the privilege statute authorized disclosure to the courts
pursuant to court order.93 Because the agency's records did bear a logical
connection to the subject matter of the trial, the Court found it incum-
bent upon the state to determine whether those records in fact contained
Brady material.94 In remanding the case, the Court noted that "[a]lthough
the obligation to disclose exculpatory material does not depend on the
presence of a specific request, we note that the degree of specificity of
[the defendant's] request may have a bearing on the trial court's assess-
ment on remand of the materiality of the nondisclosure."95
Similarly, in United States v. Agurs96 the Court suggested that the
more specific the request, the broader the prosecution's obligation to
provide a response. 7 Agurs observed that "[t]he test of materiality in a
case... in which specific information has been requested by the defense
is not necessarily the same as in a case in which no such request has been
made."98 Whether there is only a general request for Brady material, the
prosecutor has "no better notice than if no request is made."'9
A framework for the application of Brady can thus be derived, which
requires the prosecution to determine whether any other agencies may
have relevant knowledge. One efficient means of making that determina-
tion would be to extend the search obligations to those agencies most
likely to have information about the specific matter. The duty to search
93. See hi at 43-44,51-52.
94. See id. at 61. The Court added, however, that the "defendant's right to discover excul-
patory evidence does not include the unsupervised authority to search through the Common-
wealth's files." Id. at 59. Accordingly, the Court stated that "[u]nless defense counsel becomes
aware that other exculpatory evidence was withheld and brings it to the court's attention, the
prosecutor's decision on disclosure is final. Defense counsel has no constitutional right to con-
duct his own search of the State's files to argue relevance." Id
95. Id. at 58 n.15; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (observing that
"an incomplete response to a specific request not only deprives the defense of certain evidence,
but also has the effect of representing to the defense that the evidence does not exist.
[Therefore,] the defense might abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial
strategies .... ).
96. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
97. See id. at 106 ("Although there is, of course, no duty to provide defense counsel with
unlimited discovery of everything known by the prosecutor, if the subject matter of such a re-
quest is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists, it is reasonable
to require the prosecutor to respond .... ). The Court added that "[w]hen the prosecutor re-
ceives a specific and relevant request, the failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excus-
able." Id; see also United States v. Brooks, 966 F.2d 1500, 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that
where "there is an explicit request for an apparently very easy examination, and a non-trivial
prospect that the examination might yield material exculpatory information, we think the
prosecution should make the inquiry").
98. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106 (footnote omitted).
99. See hi at 106-07. "[T]here is no significant difference between cases in which there has
been merely a general request for exculpatory matter and cases... in which there has been no
request at all." Id. at 107.
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might encompass, for example, a particular agency in circumstances
where law enforcement and that organization had conducted comple-
mentary efforts, or where the second agency had provided information
directly supporting the specific investigation. Clearly, close coordination
between the activities of law enforcement and intelligence agencies in a
particular matter should subject the intelligence files to Brady search.
Accordingly, an Assistant United States Attorney prosecuting an in-
ternational narcotics case under 21 U.S.C. § 952 (1994) would request a
search of intelligence community files if she had reason to believe that
the intelligence agencies possessed relevant knowledge about the specific
matter. But, as United States v. Morris illustrates, ° the case law should
not require such a search otherwise, so the mere fact that an intelligence
agency has collected information on international narcotics trafficking in
general, without more, should not subject that agency to Brady strictures
in that case.
In reviewing defense requests to extend discovery to intelligence
agencies, the courts must determine whether a valid basis exists, or
whether the inquiry is merely a stab in the dark. In the former situation,
courts will be more likely to conclude that the prosecution team encom-
passes the other named government elements. An individual affiliated
with an international terrorist organization, for example, may be under
indictment for acts of domestic terrorism. If he submits a specific request
for Brady material potentially contained in CIA files, and articulates par-
ticular reasons to believe that the CIA has information about him or oth-
ers who may have committed the crime, or has worked jointly with law
enforcement on the matter, a court likely would find that the Brady obli-
gations in that instance extend to the CIA. Even before the court's deci-
sion, the prosecution may decide to conduct a file search of CIA records
in anticipation of that result.
But if the defendant were to submit a more general request, such as a
request simply for any Brady materials possessed by any U.S. Govern-
ment entity, the courts might well find no obligation to require such a
broad set of searches, even from the CIA. In the absence of any connec-
tion between a domestic defendant and a foreign terrorist group, and
without any indication that law enforcement and intelligence had coop-
erated on the investigation, it is unlikely such an obligation would be
found.
B. The Jencks Act
Although the Jencks Act applies to a more limited set of items than
100. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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does Brady, the analysis for alignment purposes is largely similar. The
Act addresses statements "in the possession of the United States," but
does not define the scope of that clause. Concurrently, however, the Act
"protects Government files from unnecessary and vexatious 'fishing ex-
peditions' by defendants."' ' The Ninth Circuit attempted to simplify in-
terpretation of this issue in United States v. Durham,'2 concluding that
"for Jencks Act purposes, a statement is in the possession of the United
States when it is in the possession of the prosecutor."1 3 Nonetheless, this
approach still leaves open the question of just when a witness statement
will be deemed to be in the prosecutor's possession.
The Ninth Circuit has set forth its rationale in terms of the joint inves-
tigation inquiry. In Durham, the defendant had challenged the federal
prosecutor's failure to produce a state police official's notes from an in-
terview with a key prosecution witness. The federal agent in charge of the
investigation had prepared a report indicating that he believed a particu-
lar state officer had taken the witness's statement, and the defendant
claimed that the Jencks Act had required the federal prosecutors to pro-
duce the results of that state officer's witness interview.104
Rejecting the defendant's argument, the court found that the state in-
vestigator's notes had not been "in the possession of the United States"
for Jencks Act purposes. The court accepted the argument that
"[a]lthough the agencies were exchanging information," the Jencks Act
discovery obligations did not extend to the state government's files be-
cause "the two agencies were not undertaking a joint investigation."'05
Rather, although the federal agent's report had mentioned the existence
of a statement by the witness, that report itself did not constitute inter-
view notes taken by the federal agent. Consequently, the prosecution had
been under no duty to "preserve and produce the interview notes taken
by [the] state investigator. '
Clearly, had the federal agent conducted the witness interview, the
government would have had a Jencks Act responsibility to produce the
notes. The Ninth Circuit reserved the question whether the Jencks Act
obligation would have extended to those state files if the federal and state
101. United States v. Carter, 613 F.2d 256, 261 (10th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted); see also
Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343,354 (1959) (stating that the "Act's major concern is with
limiting and regulating defense access to government papers"); United States v. Nickell, 552
F.2d 684, 688 (6th Cir. 1977) (noting that "[t]he purpose of the Jencks Act itself was to restrict a
defendant's right to any general exploration of the government's files").
102. 941 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991).
103. IcL at 861 (citing United States v. Polizzi, 801 F.2d 1543, 1552 (9th Cir. 1986)).
104. See id at 859.
105. Id. at 860.
106. Icd at 861.
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governments had engaged in a joint investigation.'O The court did not di-
rectly address whether the prosecution team might be more broadly de-
fined for Jencks Act purposes where two agencies are components of the
same sovereign, state or federal.
As with Brady analysis, the central element of the joint investigation
inquiry under the Jencks Act is whether the various agencies-here state
and Federal-were involved in a cooperative effort. In United States v.
Moeckly,"' the Eighth Circuit concluded that "[t]he Jencks Act does not
apply to statements made to state officials when there is no joint investi-
gation or cooperation with federal authorities."' ' Likewise, the Second
Circuit has found that even where federal and state agencies are con-
ducting simultaneous investigations into related issues, the absence of a
cooperative effort removes any duty to produce Jencks Act materials.
Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit has observed that for Jencks Act pur-
poses,
[i]mposing a rigid distinction between federal and state agencies which have
cooperated intimately from the outset of an investigation would artificially
contort the determination of what is mandated by due process. Rather than
endorse a per se rule, we prefer a case-by-base analysis of the extent of inter-
action and cooperation between the two governments.i
In one such case, the court relied upon agency law to provide a func-
tional definition of the prosecution team for Jencks Act purposes. In
107. See id. at 861 n.3. The court observed that "the two agencies were not undertaking a
joint investigation. Although the agencies were exchanging information, [it was] explained that
[the state investigator] was working on a separate investigation to bring charges.., under a...
state statute." Id. at 860.
108. 769 F.2d 453 (8th Cir. 1985).
109. United States v. Moeckly, 769 F.2d 453,463 (8th Cir. 1985).
110. See United States v. Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1975). In Bermudez, the court ob-
served:
At the post-trial hearing on the motion for a new trial the Government produced both
its own agent and the New York police detective who had participated in the State's
investigation. They both testified that there was no joint federal-state investigation...
although there were partly simultaneous separate investigations going on .... These
witnesses and the Assistant United States Attorney also stated that this local police file
was never in the possession of the prosecution or the federal investigators in this case.
This uncontradicted evidence makes clear that there was no violation of the Jencks
Act ....
Id. at 100 n.9.
Another court has asserted that "the Jencks Act does not apply to documents which are not
generated in a joint federal-state investigation." United States v. Myerson, 684 F. Supp. 41, 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). Thus, where New York City's mayor had appointed a special counsel to inves-
tigate allegations of criminal activity by a State Supreme Court Justice, the Jencks Act did not
require that the results of that investigation be produced to the defendant, since the special
counsel "was conducting a different investigation for a different purpose." Ida "Although the
Special Counsel choose to cooperate with the prosecutor and decided to give the prosecution
access to his files, this does not turn the Special Counsel into a part of the prosecution effort."
id.
111. United States v. Antone, 603 F.2d 566, 570 (5th Cir. 1979).
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112United States v. Mannarino, a state officer, who was helping federal of-
ficials supervise and interview a paid government informant and witness,
had obtained a detailed written narrative of the witness's criminal his-
tory. The state officer had destroyed that narrative sometime after the
issuance of a court order requiring compliance with the Jencks Act.
Notwithstanding the formal separation between the federal and state
sovereignties, the court found that the failure to produce that witness
statement violated the Jencks Act because the state officer had been
"functionally part of the United States Attorney's prosecutorial team,
and... his possession of [the] narrative history must be imputed to the
government." ' The state officer had had extensive involvement with the
investigation, including the acceptance of tasking from the federal offi-
cials conducting the inquiry. Drawing from agency law, the court found
the state officer's actions to be "those of the government, for, by imputa-
tion, they are the actions of an agent of the prosecution team.
114
Clearly, the existence of a joint investigation will support application
of the Jencks Act to all the agencies involved, and conversely, the ab-
sence of a joint effort ordinarily should restrict the Act's application as
well. Thus, where a state drug enforcement agency has investigated a par-
ticular narcotics dealer while the Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) separately collected information about the same trafficker, ab-
sent a coordinated effort between the DEA and the state agency, or dis-
semination of that information from the state to the prosecution, federal
prosecutors should be under no Jencks Act obligation to produce witness
statements in the state's possession. Similarly, had the CIA or the NSA
also collected information that incidentally involved that trafficker, ab-
sent a showing of dissemination to the DEA or a joint effort between the
federal law enforcement and intelligence organizations, the Jencks Act
obligations should not extend to those intelligence files.
C. Rule 16
Rule 16 applies to statements, documents, and tangible objects
112. 850 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1994).
113. Id. at 64 (footnote omitted); see also id. at 65 (concluding that the state officer's
"federally-assigned duties made him part of the prosecution team").
114. Id. at 66 (observing that "'[t]he liability of a principal is affected by the knowledge of
an agent concerning a matter as to which he acts within his power to bind the principal"'
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1958))); see also id. at 72 (concluding
that the prosecutor must demand compliance with the discovery obligations from all relevant
agencies, and stating that "'[u]ltimately, regardless of whether the prosecutor is able to frame
and enforce directives to the investigative agencies to respond candidly and fully to disclosure
orders, responsibility for failure to meet disclosure obligations will be assessed by the courts
against the prosecutor and his office' (quoting United States v. Osorio, 929 F.2d 753, 762 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
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"within the possession, custody or control of the government." The per-
tinent inquiry is thus similar to those under Brady and the Jencks Act-
in this case, the meaning of the term "government." Rule 16, of course,
does not provide an unlimited opportunity for the defendant to obtain
documents from any government agency, and where defendants may
easily obtain evidence through some other means, Rule 16 does "not en-
title the movants to a carte blanche perusal of the content of the Gov-
ernment's documentary file." '115
Additionally, a Rule 16 motion normally will be denied where a de-
fendant "is not seeking information to which he is entitled under the dis-
covery rules to enable him to defend against the current charge, [but
rather] is engaged upon a fishing expedition which, if permitted, would in
effect require the government to disgorge material contained in its inter-
nal investigatory files."16 In this context, the question is whether a re-
quest for a specific agency's files constitutes such a "fishing expedi-
tion.
117
In United States v. Trevino,"' the defendant, convicted of conspiracy
to possess and possession of marijuana, had sought at trial the probation
officer's presentence report about another party to the possession
charge. 9 Alluding to the importance of the particular relationship be-
tween the prosecution and the other government entity at hand, the Tre-
vino Court found that Rule 16(a)(1)(C) did not apply to the presentence
report, for "neither the prosecutor nor any governmental unit aligned
with him in the prosecution can have possession of or access to a presen-
tence report except in limited circumstances." 12°
In United States v. Gatto,1 the Ninth Circuit observed that Trevino
had "concluded the 'government' meant the prosecution, which is 'in the
business of introducing evidence in chief at trial.' In dictum, the [Trevino]
court included in that term the prosecutor and closely connected investi-
gative agencies."122 Gatto involved a local FBI office that had investigated
115. United States v. Zirpolo, 288 F. Supp. 993, 1020 (D.N.J. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
450 F.2d 424 (1971).
116. United States v. Wilson, 571 F. Supp. 1422,1424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
117. Id.
118. 556 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1977).
119. Ld. at 1269-70.
120. Id. at 1272.
121. 763 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1985).
122. Gatto, 763 F.2d at 1047 (citations omitted). The Trevino court distinguished between
the facts before it, in which the evidence in question (a presentence report) was traditionally
access-restricted, and a situation in which it was faced with "considering some type of report
held by an arm of the government other than the probation officer, an investigative agency, for
example .... 556 F.2d at 1272. The court asserted that in the latter situation:
different questions would be presented, those concerning the prosecutor's duty to dis-
close material not technically within his possession but to which he has ready ac-
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a company for various mail and securities fraud violations. A state agency
similarly had investigated the company, and possessed certain relevant
documents which it had located during a search of the company's trash.
The FBI did not learn of the existence of these documents until shortly
before the trial, well after the defendant had made the Rule 16 discovery
requests.17
The issue before the Gatto court was "whether rule 16(a)(1)(C) ever
requires the federal government to disclose and produce documents that
are in the actual possession, custody or control of state officials, the rele-
vance of which the federal government negligently or recklessly fails to
appreciate." '124 Distinguishing between Rule 16(a)(1)(A) and Rule
16(a)(1)(C), the court considered whether the prosecution had had actual
or constructive possession of the documents. The court found that the
due diligence standard meant that constructive possession would suffice
for purposes of Rule 16(a)(1)(A),12 but that actual possession by the fed-
eral government would be required to satisfy Rule 16(a)(1)(C).
126
The Gatto court found that the issue of constructive possession for
purposes of Rule 16(a)(1)(A) turned on whether the prosecutor, with the
exercise of due diligence, should have been aware of the existence of
documents held by another federal agency2' Although this does not im-
ess.... Certainly the prosecutor would not be allowed to avoid disclosure of evidence
by the simple expedient of leaving relevant evidence to repose in the hands of another
agency while utilizing his access to it in preparing his case for trial; such evidence is
plainly within his Rule 16 "control."
Ict (citations omitted).
123. See Gatto, 763 F.2d at 1042-43.
124. ld. at 1047.
125. See id. at 1047-48. The court further stated:
Under rule 16(a)(1)(A) ... we have recognized that the prosecutor's actual possession
is not necessary in all cases. For example.., we [have] held that the rule imposed a
duty on the prosecutor to produce copies of a defendant's statements that he did not
actually possess if the FBI possessed them and the prosecutor could have learned
about them by exercising due diligence.
Id. at 1047 (citation omitted).
126. The court observed that
a literal reading of the entire rule requires us to conclude that Congress intended no
such constructive possession extension. Moreover, even if such language were found in
rule 16(a)(1)(C), it would only create a due diligence requirement over documents in
the possession, custody, or control of some federal agency. We would still be required
to find some special reason to justify extending the requirement to documents in the
possession, custody, or control of state authorities.
Because we find no due diligence language in rule 16(a)(1)(C) at all, nor any special
reason to deviate from its plain language, we conclude that it triggers the government's
disclosure obligation only with respect to documents within the federal government's
actual possession, custody, or control.
Id. at 1048.
127. "[T]he due diligence requirement establishing constructive possession relates solely to
the prosecutor and whether he should have been aware of a statement in the possession of an-
other federal agency." Id.
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ply an affirmative duty on the part of the prosecutor to seek out docu-
ments that may or may not exist in any other agency, it does suggest that
where a prosecutor has an objective reason to believe that another fed-
eral agency may possess materials that would be within the scope of Rule
16(a)(1)(A), a search should be undertaken.
Even under Rule 16(a)(1)(C), however, courts may apply a broader
standard than simply actual possession by the prosecutor. In United States
v. Bryan,"2' the Ninth Circuit stated:
the government's obligation under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) should turn on the ex-
tent to which the prosecutor has knowledge of and access to the documents
sought by the defendant in each case. The prosecutor will be deemed to have
knowledge of and access to anything in the possession, custody or control of
any federal agency participating in the same investigation of the defendant.
129
Noting the unrealistic burden that would be placed upon the govern-
ment if it were required to search every U.S. government file potentially
containing Rule 16(a)(1)(C) material, the Bryan court confirmed the im-
portance of the existence of a joint effort.1' ° The court also conditioned
the scope of the government's duty on the prosecution's access to, and
knowledge of, the relevant documents.
The Tenth Circuit also has accorded the Rule 16 requirement a fairly
broad interpretation. In United States v. Jensen,1 the court wrote:
[I]t is argued that the government attorney had met his obligation by pro-
ducing everything he intended to use at trial and everything within his pos-
session. But the government's duty to produce is broader than this. Rule 16
requires the prosecution to produce all of defendant's written or recorded
statements that are relevant and all other documents that are material....
There is some duty of inter-agency discovery, which normally can be dis-
charged "by searching, or requesting that search be made, of the files of ad-
ministrative or police investigations of the defendant, in addition to his own
files.", 32
128. 868 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1989).
129. Bryan, 868 F.2d at 1036 (citation omitted); United States v. Robertson, 634 F. Supp.
1020, 1025 (E.D. Cal. 1986) ("[T]he scope of the term 'government' for purposes of rule
16(a)(1)(C) turns on considerations of the prosecution's access to the relevant evidence."); see
also United States v. James, 495 F.2d 434, 436 (5th Cir. 1974) (discovery cannot be avoided "by
pleading ignorance of discoverable material which is in the possession of another governmental
agency; especially... when both are supposedly working together to apprehend and convict
those engaged in the distribution of illegal drugs").
130. See Bryan, 868 F.2d at 1036 (Rule 16(a)(1)(C) does not require a federal prosecutor to
"comb the files of every federal agency which might have documents regarding the defen-
dant.... However, we do not believe that adopting a mechanical definition of 'government'
that would deny to the defendant documents accessible to the prosecution would reflect a fair
balance of the competing concerns .... ).
131. 608 F.2d 1349,1357 (10th Cir. 19709).
132- Id. at 1357 (quoting 8 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
116.05 (2d ed. 1979)). The court did not directly decide, however, "the extent of the govern-
ment's duty to provide information held by its various agencies." Id
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Nonetheless, on the specific facts the court declined to decide the
scope of the government's duty to provide documents possessed by the
Department of Justice, the Securities Exchange Commission, and the
FBI, for the failure to do so had constituted harmless error.'33
Accordingly, the question whether a joint investigation has occurred
remains relevant for Rule 16 analysis. Other courts have echoed the
Jensen rationale to find that the "duty of disclosure affects not only the
prosecutor, but the Government as a whole, including its investigative
agencies..".1 4 Considering whether documents from the local District At-
torney's office could be considered in the "possession, custody or con-
trol" of the United States Attorney, the court in United States v. Guerre-
rio35 found it necessary to review the relationship between the two
offices,136 and that "[t]he existence of a close relationship between two
prosecutor's offices is relevant to considerations of discovery responsibili-
ties."' The Guerrerio court concluded that, in the absence of a joint in-
vestigation, federal prosecutors had not had "possession, custody or con-
trol" of the District Attorney's files. 38
In contrast, where the United States closely cooperated with Cana-
dian officials in an investigation, "even absent actual possession of the
material sought, the close relationship between the two prosecutors' of-
fices did place an added discovery obligation on the U.S. government."'39
As another court put it, the question is "not whether the United States
Attorney's Office physically possesses the discovery material," but rather
"the extent to which there was a 'joint investigation' with another
agency.""14'
The analysis for purposes of Rules 16(a)(1)(A) and (C), therefore,
appears similar to that under Brady and the Jencks Act, again turning
primarily on whether a joint investigation was undertaken, whether in-
formation produced by another agency was provided to the prosecution,
or whether the prosecutor has objective reason to believe that another
133. Id.
134. United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1352 n.91 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting United
States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642,650 (D.C. Cir. 1941)).
135. 670 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
136. See id at 1218.
137. Id at 1219; see also United States v. Upton, 856 F. Supp. 727, 749 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
("The question.., whether agencies other than the United States Attorney's Office should be
considered part of the 'government' for Rule 16 purposes [depends on] the level of involvement
between the United States Attorney's Office and the other agencies.").
138. Guerrerio, 670 F. Supp. at 1219. The court found that the offices had conducted
"separate and independent investigations," and that the federal inquiry had continued after the
District Attorney's investigation had stopped. Id. at 1218.
139. Id. at 1219 n.3 (citing United States v. Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1984)).
140. Upton, 856 F. Supp. at 750.
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agency may possess responsive material. 14' And, as with discovery pursu-
ant to Brady and the Jencks Act, the more direct the participation of an
intelligence agency in investigating a particular defendant or related mat-
ters, the greater the likelihood that Rule 16 will be found to apply.
D. United States v. McVeigh
When a defendant asserts that intelligence agencies may possess dis-
coverable material, all of these discovery issues may arise. In the prosecu-
tion of Timothy McVeigh for the Oklahoma City bombing, for example,
the defense made broad discovery requests in an attempt to establish that
foreign terrorists rather than their client had committed the crime.
Defense counsel argued that the Department of Justice, CIA, NSA,
and DIA had mounted an international search for the bombers, but had
terminated those efforts prematurely following McVeigh's arrest. The de-
fense added that the intelligence agencies possessed information about
international terrorist groups that could indicate someone other than
McVeigh had carried out the Oklahoma City attack, and that accord-
ingly, the government must search the files of the CIA, NSA, and DIA
for information producible under Brady, Jencks, or Rule 16.43
Had the CIA, DIA, NSA, or other federal intelligence agencies par-
ticipated in the search for McVeigh, provided information about his ac-
tivities to the prosecution, or jointly investigated the tragedy with U.S.
law enforcement, the defense clearly would have had grounds to seek
discovery from those entities. In contrast, the defendant's request sought
material peripheral to the investigation of his own activities-rather he
was searching for information to suggest that some other person had
committed the crime, absent any specific reason to believe that such ma-
terial would be found144
At the pre-trial hearing, the government reported "that the intelli-
gence agencies were not 'aligned' with the criminal investigation,', 45 re-
flecting the normal rule that general requests for material do not require
the prosecution to search the files of unrelated agencies. But even so, on
141. Indeed, in comparing Rule 16(a)(1)(C) with Brady, the Bryan court observed that
[a]s with Rule 16(a)(1)(C)'s definition of government, we see no reason why the prose-
cutor's obligation under Brady should stop at the border of the district. If a federal
prosecutor has knowledge of and access to exculpatory information as defined in
Brady and its progeny that is outside the district, then the prosecutor must disclose it
to the defense.
United States v. Bryan, 868 F.2d 1032,1037 (9th Cir. 1989).
142- See United States v. McVeigh, 923 F. Supp. 1310,1312 (D. Colo. 1996).
143. See id.
144. See, e.g., McVeigh Attorney Accuses Government of Stalling On Information, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 29,1996, at 17A.
145. McVeigh, 923 F. Supp. at 1315.
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the specific facts of that case, the government added, and the court con-
cluded, that the lack of alignment nonetheless did "not limit the duty to
inquire of such agencies for information which may be exculpatory or
impeaching to the preparation of the defense."'1 46 The court directed "the
prosecutors [to] respond to the defendants' requests for information from
a broad perspective of the government as a whole."147
During questioning by the court, the prosecution reported that it had
asked the intelligence agencies to conduct "a very broad search....
[T]hey have produced more documents than would really qualify ... be-
ing careful because of the nature of this case and our request to err on
the side of caution producing more documents than we think would be
necessary to turn over."'148 The court observed that
recognizing the duty to disclose exculpatory and impeaching information es-
tablished in Brady v. Maryland... as well as the discovery rights of the de-
fendants, the prosecutors.., have requested from the CIA, the DIA, and the
NSA 'all material they had under Brady, Rule 16, and [the] Jencks Act and
any information they had which would tend to show that these defendants
did not participate in the crime or that others carried out the crime.
149
In McVeigh, the government did not argue that the lack of alignment
should be dispositive. Normally, of course, it should not be incumbent
upon the prosecution to search the records of unrelated entities where
there has been no showing that they participated in a joint endeavor with
law enforcement, provided information of value to the prosecution, or
for some other reason may be expected to hold responsive material in
their files. But in McVeigh, with high public interest in the proceedings
and the need to ensure both the substance and perception of a fair trial
under extraordinary circumstances, both the government and the judge
interpreted the discovery obligations in the widest possible fashion.
Rather than establishing a new rule for intelligence information, there-
fore, the case may be read more narrowly, as presenting a unique set of
circumstances in which the court and the government afforded the de-
fendant expanded rights by conducting extensive searches of non-aligned
federal agencies.
IV. DEFINING THE TEAM: ALIGNMENT AND THE DISCOVERY OF
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION
How, therefore, to resolve the issues of search and discovery of intel-
ligence agency information?
146. Id.
147. Id. (emphasis added).
148. Id. at 1313.
149. Id. (citation omitted).
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At the outset, it should be observed that section 814 of the Intelli-
gence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997"0 enacted new section
105A of the National Security Act, which provides in relevant part:
elements of the intelligence community may, upon the request of a United
States law enforcement agency, collect information outside the United States
about individuals who are not United States persons. Such elements may
collect such information notwithstanding that the law enforcement agency in-
tends to use the information collected for purposes of a law enforcement in-
vestigation or counterintelligence investigation.
Accordingly, and despite the National Security Act's law enforcement
proviso applicable to the CIA,5 2 section 105A confers upon members of
the intelligence community a limited investigative authority to support
law enforcement even where there may be no independent intelligence
interest.
No court has yet considered section 105A in the context of discovery,
and neither the Senate nor the Conference Report addresses that issue."'
But where an intelligence agency has accepted tasking from law en-
forcement pursuant to section 105A, a court may well conclude that dis-
covery in a prosecution directly involving the subject of that tasking
should extend to that agency. And even where a subsequent prosecution
involves a separate party, alignment may be found if the subject matter of
the prosecution bears a close relationship, or is identical, to the informa-
tion collected by the intelligence agency in response to the law enforce-
ment request.
But what about discovery where there has been no section 105A
tasking, nor any dissemination of intelligence of general interest that sub-
sequently becomes relevant to a prosecution? When, and to what extent,
absent some specific indication that CIA or NSA records may be discov-
erable, must a prosecutor request a search of those agencies' records?
Current procedures under a separate provision of Title 18 suggest an an-
swer.
A. Section 3504
Section 3504 of Title 18 provides that in a criminal prosecution, the
150. 50 U.S.C.A. § 403-5a (West Supp. 1997).
151. IaL § 403-5a(a). With respect to components of the Department of Defense, section
105A(b)(1) provides that the authority extends only to the NSA, DIA, NRO, and the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency. See id § 403-5a(b)(1).
The term "United States person" includes U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens, unincorpo-
rated associations substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, and
U.S. corporations that are not directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
See id. § 403-3(c).
152. See supra text accompanying note 12.
153. The provision originated in S. 1718, the Senate version of the legislation.
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government must "affirm or deny" whether it has conducted unlawful
electronic surveillance "upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence
is inadmissible because it is the primary product of an unlawful act or be-
cause it was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act."'1 4 As with
other avenues of discovery, a request under section 3504 may require a
search of intelligence community files for responsive material.
As with discovery requests under Brady, the more specific the section
3504 request, the greater the government's obligation to respond. In
United States v. Moeller,15 the district court stated that "there is consider-
able merit in the view... that 'a general claim [of wire-tapping] requires
only a response appropriate to such a claim."'156 By this, the court wrote,
it meant that:
[a]n adequately supported claim of this sort, at least raising a suspicion that
the evidence came from wiretapping, may well require the government to
"affirm or deny" on the basis of a comprehensive inquiry of agencies with
surveillance capability. An adequate claim that an individual has been the
subject of governmental curiosity may suffice to require an inquiry of agen-
cies with intelligence gathering responsibilities. However, a naked allegation
that wiretapping has occurred may be sufficient to trigger §3504's obligation
to make some response, but not necessarily an obligation to check the files of
government agencies having no apparent connection with a case. To such a
claim, the sworn denial by the prosecutor and the investigating agencies
should suffice.1 7
Thus, the Moeller court was satisfied with the government's submis-
sion of affidavits from various federal and state entities, including local
FBI agents in numerous cities, as well as the police charged with investi-
gating the arson in question, stating that no wiretapping had occurred,
and similarly that all of the government's "evidence had been obtained
from 'direct' sources." ' The court denied the defendant's assertion that
other government agencies, such as the CIA, should have been
searched. 59
The cases construing section 3504 also conform to those analyzing the
government's obligations under both the Jencks Act and Rule 16,
whereby neither provision permits the unfettered search of government
files. In this respect, the Second Circuit has observed that the ability to
discover evidence of electronic surveillance under section 3504 does not
constitute an invitation to conduct an indiscriminate search:
Once a substantial claim is made under the statute, those government agen-
154. 18 U.S.C. § 3504 (1994).
155. 402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975).
156. Id. at 52 (quoting United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 1974)).
157. Id.
158. I& at 51.
159. See id. at 51-53.
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cies closest to the investigation must scrupulously search their files and sub-
mit affidavits affirming or denying the validity of the aggrieved party's claim
and indicating which agencies have been checked. The statute was not in-
tended, however, to transform an investigation by the government into an in-
vestigation of the government where claims of illegality lack substantial sup-
port.... Unsupported suspicion and patently frivolous assertions of
government misconduct do not constitute a 'claim' under §3504 sufficient to
trigger the government's obligation to disrupt Arand jury proceedings and
check thoroughly the applicable agency records.
A defendant cannot obligate the prosecution to search every agency
that conceivably may have been involved, simply by making a general in-
quiry. Rather, the defendant must submit a request that is neither over-
broad nor simply a "fishing expedition." To satisfy the threshold, the re-
quest must be carefully crafted, articulating plausible reasons to believe
that the specific agency may have mounted such surveillance.
B. Brady, Jencks, and Rule 16
The approach under section 3504 comports well with search and dis-
covery under Brady, Jencks, and Rule 16. In each instance, the prosecu-
tion team may consist solely of the U.S. Attorney and the law enforce-
ment agency that investigated the matter, or also may comprise a number
of additional agencies. And, as with the approach under section 3504,
elements such as knowledge, access, and relationship will determine the
scope of discovery obligations under Brady, the Jencks Act, and Rule 16.
The duty to search under each of those authorities will not be limited to
the prosecutor's office; rather, the prosecution must seek and produce
responsive material from any other agency with whom there has been a
joint investigation or other close contact on the particular matter, or
which the prosecution has objective reason to believe may possess such
material.
But without a strong showing by a defendant that discovery truly is
warranted, prosecution searches and defendants' discovery should not
normally be required of other entities, whether or not they are intelli-
gence agencies, that neither were involved in the specific case nor pro-
vided information directly supporting the investigation.' In this regard,
160. In re Millow, 529 F.2d 770,774-75 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal citations omitted).
161. The cases requiring that prosecutors turn over exculpatory evidence can be read as
applying broadly or narrowly. Read narrowly, the obligation applies to information in the hands
of the prosecutors themselves and to the investigators who developed the case. Read broadly,
the obligation covers any information in any file. In my view, the better reading of the cases is
that the government ordinarily must search only those records available to the prosecutor and
those aligned with the prosecutor. On that reading, intelligence records would be subject to dis-
covery whenever the two communities engaged in a coordinated investigation-although
probably only the information gathered in that coordinated effort should be open to discovery.
Stewart A. Baker, Should Spies be Cops?, 97 FOREIGN POL'Y 49-50 (winter 1994-1995). Baker
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the United States Attorneys' Manual recognizes that the intelligence and
law enforcement communities may and should cooperate in appropriate
instances, while still preserving the distinction between their two roles.
The Manual's approach is consistent with that of section 3504, as well as
judicial interpretations of the alignment rules of Brady, Jencks, and Rule
16.
The Manual describes the method by which the Department of Jus-
tice reviews a prosecutor's request for the search of intelligence agency
records, and notes that such searches may be requested for various rea-
sons. First are searches that are not necessarily required by law, but con-
ducted either to assist in deciding whether and how to prosecute, or to
provide the prosecution with foreknowledge of intelligence-related issues
that may arise following an indictment. And, of course, there are
searches undertaken pursuant to the requirements of Brady, the Jencks
Act, and Rule 16. Discussing these various avenues, the Manual provides
that a request will be granted:
only when there exist objective articulable facts justifying the conclusion that
(1) within specific files, or category of files, there will likely be information of
which the prudent prosecutor should be aware in deciding whether, or
against whom, or for what offenses to seek an indictment from the grand
jury;
(2) there are intelligence-related issues likely to arise post-indictment that
the prosecutor should address preemptively, and that searching [intelligence
community] files is likely to produce information helpful to resolving those
issues; or
(3) there are documents or information within the intelligence community
that fall reasonably within the scope of the prosecutor's affirmative discovery
obligations to the defendant, as that scope has been defined by the federal
162
courts.
Reviewing the third category, that of searches required by Brady, the
Jencks Act, or Rule 16, the Manual states that an intelligence agency will
have actively participated in a criminal investigation or prosecution, so
that it has become aligned with the prosecution team and subject to dis-
covery, when it "has served in a capacity that exceeds the role of provid-
ing mere tips or leads based on information generated independently of
the criminal case. 16' As an example, the Manual notes that "alignment
adds that "[i]f there is no coordinated investigation but the defendant believes that his other
activities are likely to have been of interest to intelligence agencies, no searches should be or-
dered-at least in the absence of strong indications that particular intelligence records will pro-
duce exculpatory evidence." hL at 50.
162. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSCE MANUAL, Vol. 9A
Criminal Division, pt. 3A tit. 9, ch. 90.210(B) (1997).
163. Id. ch. 90.210(D)(1).
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likely exists where an intelligence agency has provided information to a
law enforcement agency or to the prosecution, which information serves
independently as a factual element in support of a search warrant, arrest
warrant, indictment, etc."16" Citing United States v. Trevino,"5 however,
the Manual cautions that "a government agency does not necessarily fall
into alignment with the prosecutor's office, thus requiring a search of its
files, simply because it is an agency of the same government and arguably
could have exculpatory evidence regarding the defendant.'
166
But even without any active participation in the investigation by the
intelligence community, and even absent any specific request by the de-
fendant, the prosecution still may be required to search intelligence files.
Discussing Brady, for example, the Manual requires a search of intelli-
gence records when the prosecutor has "direct knowledge of potential
Brady and/or other discovery material in the possession of the intelli-
gence community" or, even without any such knowledge, there "exists
any objective indication suggesting that the intelligence community pos-
sesses evidence that meets the Brady case law standard of materiality."'
6
Thus, and again following the case law, the prosecutor may not turn a
blind eye to his or her actual knowledge even if it is gleaned from collat-
eral sources, such as previous work on a separate investigation. Accord-
ingly, certain intelligence records may be subject to search even where
the agency concerned technically may not have constituted part of the
prosecution team.
The Manual also addresses production under the Jencks Act or Rule
16, again founding the inquiry largely on the level of knowledge attrib-
uted to the prosecution. With respect to those provisions, the Manual ob-
serves that "[i]n the absence of actual or implied foreknowledge.., the
prosecutor would have no obligation to search for such materials in
I[ntelligence] C[ommunity] files over that which would exist in other
criminal cases not involving IC agencies and/or classified information."'
'
As a matter of prudence, however, the Manual states that the prose-
cutor still must initiate contact with the intelligence community if he or
she "whether pre- or post-indictment, acquires information that suggests
the defendant may have had, or as part of his defense at trial will assert
that he has had, contacts with the intelligence community or with an in-
164. l
165. 556 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1977). For a discussion of Trevino, see supra text accompany-
ing notes 118-120.
166. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANUAL, Vol. 9A
Criminal Division, pt. 3A tit. 9, ch. 90.210(D)(1) (1997).
167. Id. ch. 90.210(D)(2)(a).
168. IM. ch. 90.210(D)(2)(b).
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telligence component of the law enforcement community.'169 This re-
quirement recognizes that even where discovery may not appear man-
dated by the law, intelligence-related issues still may arise and the wise
prosecutor must anticipate them if possible.7
V. CONCLUSION
How, then, to minimize the burdens upon prosecutors and intelli-
gence agencies, while preserving the discovery rights of defendants?
Careful planning in specific situations may permit steps to avoid casting
an intelligence agency as part of the prosecution team, while maintaining
both the ability of the government to move forward and the discovery
equities of potential defendants.
For example, the CIA may work abroad with a narcotics informant;
should that informant have knowledge of a narcotics trafficking violation,
the Agency may arrange a meeting between the individual and a repre-
sentative of the Drug Enforcement Administration. As a law enforce-
ment officer, the DEA agent then may interview the informant, prepare
the necessary report, and obtain admissible evidence, and at trial, the
agent will be available to establish the chain of custody. Accordingly, in
such an situation no discovery may be required of CIA records, for all
items relevant to the prosecution will be possessed by the DEA.
Similarly, an intelligence agency may provide basic lead information
to law enforcement. In such instances, the law enforcement agency may
analyze that information, decide whether an investigation is warranted,
and independently develop th6 necessary evidence to support a prosecu-
tion. Here as well, no obligation to search normally should extend to the
intelligence agency, where it neither participated in a joint investigation
nor provided information for use in the prosecution, and absent any ob-
jective indication that it may possess some other form of responsive ma-
terial.
At one end of the spectrum will be cases in which domestic defen-
dants, with no known connection to overseas activities or intelligence op-
erations, are indicted on domestic charges and seek wide-ranging discov-
ery from U.S. intelligence agencies. In such situations, prosecutors
169. Id. ch. 90.210(D)(3).
170. Moreover, even where there is no "known duty to the defendant [nor] ... a known
nexus to national security matters," a prosecutor may wish to request a search of intelligence
community records where a pending prosecution may concern foreign officials, violations of
U.S. export controls or trade sanctions, international terrorism or narcotics trafficking, or per-
sons presently or formerly associated with an intelligence agency. Id. ch. 90.210(D)(4). De-
scribed by the Manual as "prudential," when used properly this type of search can assist the
prosecutor in anticipating related issues that may arise, and in some cases lead to the acquisition
of evidence from another source.
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normally should find no requirement to search intelligence agency files,
and should oppose defense requests to extend discovery to those agen-
cies.
At the other end will be the relatively few instances in which the CIA,
NSA, or DIA provides a law enforcement agency with specific informa-
tion about criminal defendants, their organizations, or the underlying of-
fenses, with that information employed directly in a prosecution. In such
cases, discovery normally would extend to the intelligence agency, so that
the appropriate records searches should be conducted. Additionally, in
some instances a defendant may claim that his or her actions had been
authorized as part of a secret intelligence operation. Although such
claims rarely are upheld, in such circumstances a search request normally
would be appropriate in order to marshal the facts.
But beyond those extremes, there may be instances in which the
boundaries are less clearly delineated, such as where an intelligence
agency provides law enforcement with information that relates to a
prosecution only generally, if at all. For example, the intelligence com-
munity routinely collects information about the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction, and disseminates that information as appropriate to
federal law enforcement agencies and other recipients.
As a result, discovery in the course of certain U.S. prosecutions of de-
fendants who have been charged with proliferation offenses may extend
to intelligence agency records as well. In contrast, however, where there
is no reason to believe that a particular intelligence agency has any in-
formation relating to a specific defendant or the subject matter of a par-
ticular prosecution, then the discovery process normally should not ex-
tend to its records. And prosecutions of wholly domestic crimes
ordinarily should not engender searches, even where intelligence agen-
cies may collect information abroad about topics that are generally com-
parable in nature, but still unrelated to the prosecution at hand.
Of course, where a prosecutor has objective reason to believe that an
intelligence agency may possess responsive material, discovery would be
appropriate. And in cases of exceptional national importance such as
United States v. McVeigh," 2 attorneys and judges still may decide to
search beyond the parameters that may be strictly required.73 But in the
regular course of events, the normal search and discovery procedures
should be applied to intelligence records as well. The significant resource
171. Such assertions normally involve attempts to invoke the public authority defense. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.3.
172. 923 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1996).
173. Prosecutors also may request prudential searches where cases collaterally may involve
issues of classified information or the national security. See supra note 170.
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demands that otherwise would be placed upon prosecutors and intelli-
gence agencies, as well as the need to avoid unnecessary risks to intelli-
gence sources and methods, together counsel such a course.
Where law enforcement and an intelligence agency have become
aligned in a specific prosecution, or where the prosecutor has reason to
believe that an intelligence agency possesses responsive material, then
the constitutional and statutory obligations reach those agencies as well.
In such cases, any associated resource burdens or litigation risks must
yield to the preservation and defense of the Bill of Rights.
But both U.S. Attorneys and trial judges should ensure that the dis-
covery of intelligence information is neither unduly circumscribed nor
overly extended. The assertion, or even the existence, of some remote
connection between the intelligence records and a pending prosecution
should not stretch normal discovery procedures beyond their customary
bounds. Rather, applied with deliberation, the standard scope of discov-
ery should continue to protect defendants' rights even where intelligence
agency information may be involved.

